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The Same-Sex Marriage Cases and 
Federal Jurisdiction: On Third-Party 
Standing and Why the Domestic 
Relations Exception to Federal 
Jurisdiction Should Be Overruled 
STEVEN G. CALABRESI* & GENNA L. SINEL** 
In this paper, we consider two questions. First, we ad-
dress whether there was proper standing for the Article III 
courts to decide United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 133 S. 
Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) and Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. 
Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013). We conclude that the third-party ap-
pellants lacked standing in federal court. Second, we exam-
ine whether cases challenging state same-sex marriage bans 
were and are cases in “law and equity” or instead, barred 
under the domestic relations exception for the purposes of 
federal question jurisdiction. We conclude that the domestic 
relations exception to federal jurisdiction is an archaic, his-
torical remnant that should be overruled by the U.S. Su-
preme Court, and thus, the Article III federal courts have 
jurisdiction to hear pure marital status cases despite their 
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domestic nature. We call on the Supreme Court to eliminate 
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Before the ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges,1 the U.S. Supreme 
Court took action to legalize same-sex marriage. The Court struck 
down the federal Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) in United 
States v. Windsor,2 and then, in Hollingsworth v. Perry,3 the Su-
preme Court allowed a lower court ruling to go into effect that 
deemed same-sex marriage bans unconstitutional. However, the 
holdings in Windsor and Hollingsworth reveal a tension in the 
Court’s interpretation of standing. In both cases, a third party at-
tempted to appeal a lower court ruling, but only in Windsor was the 
third party found to have met the standing requirement.4 
In Hollingsworth, Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion held 
that several proponents of a California proposition lacked standing 
to appeal the lower court order, given that the Attorney General and 
Governor of California agreed that the proposition in question was 
unconstitutional.5 Similarly, in Windsor, President Obama agreed 
with the Second Circuit ruling below that the federal government 
had acted unconstitutionally in defining marriage exclusively as the 
union of one man and one woman;6 however, unlike the ruling in 
Hollingsworth, the Court found standing for the Bipartisan Legal 
Advisory Group (“BLAG”) of the U.S. House of Representatives to 
                                                                                                             
 1 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 2 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (“DOMA instructs all federal officials, and 
indeed all persons with whom same-sex couples interact, . . . that [same-sex] mar-
riage is less worthy than the marriages of others. The federal statute is invalid, for 
no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure 
those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and 
dignity.”). 
 3 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013) (“Because petitioners have not satisfied their 
burden to demonstrate standing to appeal the judgment of the District Court, the 
Ninth Circuit was without jurisdiction to consider the appeal. The judgment of the 
Ninth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions to dismiss the 
appeal for lack of jurisdiction.”). 
 4 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684–89; Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2667–68. 
 5 See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2660, 2667–68. 
 6 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684. 
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defend DOMA.7 Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and 
Thomas dissented here, on the grounds that, first, the President had 
no standing to appeal a Second Circuit ruling with which he agreed, 
and second, that BLAG lacked standing to appeal as a third party to 
the case.8 
As a matter of standing, we agree with Chief Justice Roberts’s 
majority opinion in Hollingsworth and Justice Scalia’s dissent in 
Windsor. Private busybodies lack standing in federal court to defend 
statutes denied defenses by federal or state executive officials. 
Nonetheless, we disagree with the four conservative Justices on the 
U.S. Supreme Court on the merits of the same-sex marriage issue 
and agree with Justice Anthony M. Kennedy’s decision in Windsor 
and Obergefell that DOMA and state bans on same-sex marriage are 
unconstitutional. 
There remains the issue of the domestic relations exception to 
federal jurisdiction. The federal jurisdictional problems with cases 
challenging the constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans are 
much more complex than is even recognized in the conservative Jus-
tices’ opinions in Windsor and Hollingsworth. There is a serious 
question under current case law as to whether the federal courts have 
either federal question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction to decide 
any pure same-sex marriage cases.9 This dilemma stems from the 
longstanding domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction 
that goes back to the founding of the Republic; pure marriage-law 
cases cannot be heard in federal court.10 We conclude that the do-
mestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction ought to be read as 
not applying to marital-status cases. Instead, we would confine the 
exception to purely religious matters, such as excommunication. 
                                                                                                             
 7 See id. at 2684–85, 2689. 
 8 See id. at 2698 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 9 See, e.g., Chevalier v. Barnhart, 803 F.3d 789, 804 (6th Cir. 2015) (deter-
mining that the domestic relations exception did not bar the Appellant from com-
mencing an action in diversity against her female partner). 
 10 See, e.g., Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 697–701, 703 (1992); In 
re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890) (“The whole subject of the domestic re-
lations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States 
and not to the laws of the United States.”). See generally Anne C. Dailey, Feder-
alism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV 1787, 1822 (1995) (“The domestic rela-
tions exception reflected the view that family law constituted a distinctly commu-
nitarian endeavor, a subject reflecting locally shared values and norms.”). 
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A.   Pure Marriage Laws and the Question of “Cases in Law or 
Equity” 
The U.S. Constitution and the federal statutes on diversity and 
federal question jurisdiction all employ the terminology “cases in 
law or equity” in their grants of federal jurisdiction to the Article III 
courts. Accordingly, the federal courts are restricted to hearing cases 
that fall under that category. The scope of the domestic relations ex-
ception becomes relevant when trying to assess whether cases re-
volving purely around questions of marital status can be considered 
as “cases in law or equity,” and can thereby be heard in federal court. 
When state laws criminalized same-sex marriage, there was no fed-
eral jurisdiction issue because criminal cases were law-or-equity 
suits. However, cases challenging the federal constitutionality of 
state laws that only define the status of marriage are not so defini-
tively determined, leaving room for debate as to whether such cases 
were appropriately be heard in federal court. 
In England during 1787, “Cases in Law and Equity” was a legal 
term of art that encompassed only those cases that were brought be-
fore the Courts of Law (the Court of King’s Bench or the Court of 
Common Pleas) and the Courts of Equity (the Court of Exchequer 
or the Court of Chancery).11 At the time, matrimonial causes were 
only heard in the Ecclesiastical Courts of the Church of England, 
and it was not until the passage of the Matrimonial Causes Act of 
1857 that the ordinary English courts were empowered to hear mat-
rimonial and divorce cases.12 This was partly because, prior to 1857, 
marriage in England was considered to be a strictly religious sacra-
ment and not a contract.13 Marriage was similarly viewed in the 
United States when Article III was enacted.14 
By 1868, however, when the Fourteenth Amendment was 
adopted, the idea of marriage had evolved. Marriage was thought of 
as both a sacrament and a contract, as Andrea Matthews and Steven 
                                                                                                             
 11 For a general discussion regarding the Courts of Law and the Courts of 
Equity, see generally J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL 
HISTORY 97–116 (4th ed. 2002). 
 12 See Hazel D. Lord, Husband and Wife: English Marriage Law from 1750: 
A Bibliographic Essay, 11 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 1, 12, 16–17 (2001). 
 13 See id. at 4. 
 14 See Dailey, supra note 10, at 1821 (“From the earliest days of the Repub-
lic . . . , family law has unquestionably belonged to the states.”). 
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Calabresi argue in their article, “Originalism and Loving v. Vir-
ginia,” and Article III had been the “Supreme Law of the Land” for 
seventy-nine years.15 Under Article III, matrimonial causes were not 
“cases in law and equity,” and, although the Fourteenth Amendment 
created new rights, it did not add to the Article III jurisdiction of the 
federal courts, which mandated that pure matrimonial causes (or do-
mestic relations cases, as called by modern-day courts) be adjudi-
cated exclusively in state courts.16 Consequently, many contend that 
a Fourteenth Amendment argument against same-sex marriage bans 
can only be addressed by state courts, each state determining for it-
self how the Fourteenth Amendment is to be understood within its 
own borders.17 Under this reasoning, the Supreme Court would not 
have had jurisdiction to overturn state bans on same-sex marriage in 
Obergefell in June of 2015. 
We conclude that the U.S. Supreme Court ought to overrule the 
so-called domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction. We 
make this argument while noting that under American federalism, 
the law of marriage and divorce is in “pith and substance” a question 
of state law and not one of federal law.18 In our opinion, DOMA was 
unconstitutional because Congress did not have the enumerated 
                                                                                                             
 15 See generally Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 15, at 1413–24. 
 16 See Meredith Johnson Harbach, Is the Family a Federal Question?, 66 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 131, 150–52, 165–66 (2009). See generally, U.S. CONST. 
art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, 
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, 
or which shall be made, under their Authority . . . .”). 
 17 See generally Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New Ju-
risprudence of Gay Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 817, 852–53 (2014) (“[I]t was nearly 
impossible for gay rights advocates to persuade courts that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. . . . After Bow-
ers, courts consistently rejected homosexual equality claims on the ground that 
‘[i]t would be quite anomalous . . . to declare status defined by conduct that states 
may constitutionally criminalize as deserving of strict scrutiny under the equal 
protection clause.’”). 
 18 Reference re Securities Act, 2011 SCC 66, 3 S.C.R. 837 (2011) (discussing 
the pith and substance test in Canadian federalism cases). The Canadian Supreme 
Court and, prior to 1949, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council sitting in 
London, England, have long decided Canadian federalism cases by asking 
whether a statute is “in pith and substance” a matter of Canadian federal law or a 
matter of Canadian provincial law. Id. We think this doctrine is a very useful one, 
and we would urge the U.S. Supreme Court to apply the “pith and substance” test 
in U.S. federalism cases. 
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power to adopt a federal marriage statute. It thus may seem to follow 
that the very same Constitution, which leaves the definition of mar-
riage to the states, would also prohibit the Article III federal courts 
from hearing matrimonial causes or domestic relations cases. How-
ever, we reject that argument and demonstrate that an originalist un-
derstanding of the word “equity” supports the exercise of judicial 
power to extend federal jurisdiction over domestic relations. 
B.   Our Framework 
In this article, we argue that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Scalia were right on the federal jurisdictional issues in Windsor and 
Hollingsworth. In Part I, we maintain that, first, litigants cannot ap-
peal decisions with which they agree, and second, that private bus-
ybodies in the House of Representatives lack standing to appeal a 
ruling legalizing same-sex marriage under federal law. In Part II, we 
expand on that argument and explain why third parties lack standing 
to defend the constitutionality of state-adopted initiatives when the 
executive branch of the state governments so decline. 
Finally, in Part III, we discuss the much broader federal jurisdic-
tional problems with lawsuits like Windsor and Hollingsworth al-
luded to in this introduction. The case in Hollingsworth, in particu-
lar, could be argued to be absolutely not one in law or equity that 
could be heard by Article III federal courts. Nevertheless, after con-
sidering this argument at some length, we reject this idea and con-
clude that Article III’s grant of equity jurisdiction has inherent evo-
lutive meaning, and hence may expand to cover deficiencies in the 
law. In today’s world, the federal courts’ jurisdiction over cases in 
equity arising under federal law is best understood as encompassing 
marital-status lawsuits, like the various same-sex marriage cases de-
cided on the merits by federal courts of appeals. Thus, we close this 
article by calling on the U.S. Supreme Court to eliminate the linger-
ing features of the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdic-
tion. 
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I. THE THIRD-PARTY APPELLANTS IN WINDSOR LACKED 
STANDING IN FEDERAL COURT 
A.   Windsor Facts and DOMA 
In United States v. Windsor,19 the Obama Administration sought 
to appeal a Second Circuit holding with which it agreed to the effect 
that DOMA was unconstitutional.20 The Administration argued that 
since it was continuing to enforce DOMA21 and had been ordered to 
pay Windsor a tax refund, it suffered sufficient legal injury to permit 
an appeal of the Second Circuit’s legal ruling, despite agreeing with 
the holding on the merits.22 To understand the Administration’s 
claim, it is necessary to describe the background and procedural pos-
ture of the Windsor case. 
DOMA was adopted in 1996.23 Section 3 of the Act amended 
the Dictionary Act to provide for a federal definition of the words 
“marriage” and “spouse” wherever they appeared in the U.S. 
Code.24 Under DOMA, the word “marriage” in federal law was de-
fined to mean “only a legal union between one man and one woman 
as husband and wife . . . .”25 Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer were 
both women, and they married in Canada in 2007.26 They lived to-
gether in New York State, where same-sex marriage was legal, and 
the state accepted the legality of their Canadian marriage.27 
Spyer died in February 2009, and she left her estate to Wind-
sor.28 Because of DOMA, “Windsor did not qualify for the marital 
                                                                                                             
 19 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 20 See id. at 2684. 
 21 Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) of 1996, Pub. L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 
2419, by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (amending 1 U.S.C. § 7 
and 28 U.S.C. § 1783C); see 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), amended by DOMA, 110 Stat. 
at 2419–20, and invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); 
28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012), amended by DOMA, 110 Stat. at 2419, and invalidated 
by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 22 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684–86. 
 23 See DOMA, 110 Stat. at 2419. 
 24 See DOMA § 3 (amending 1 U.S.C. § 7). 
 25 Id. 
 26 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
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exemption from the federal estate tax,” so she paid $363,053 in fed-
eral inheritance taxes and sought a subsequent refund from the In-
ternal Revenue Service (“IRS”).29 The IRS denied her request, also 
because of DOMA.30 Windsor then sued the United States in the 
Southern District of New York, contending that DOMA was uncon-
stitutional.31 The Obama Administration “notified the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 530D, that the 
Department of Justice would no longer defend the constitutionality 
of DOMA’s § 3”; however, the President did direct his administra-
tion to continue DOMA’s enforcement.32 The stated rationale for 
this order was to facilitate judicial review of DOMA’s constitution-
ality.33 Consequently, BLAG voted to intervene in this case in order 
to defend the constitutionality of § 3 of DOMA.34 The district court 
allowed BLAG to intervene as an interested party.35 
B.   Windsor’s Federal Standing: An Exception to the General 
Taxpayer Rule 
In the 1920’s the United States Supreme Court established the 
general rule that taxpayers do not have standing in federal court to 
challenge the constitutionality of a tax or expenditure of government 
funds.36 The Court’s decision rejects taxpayer standing where there 
is no particularized, individual legal injury.37 This case reaffirms 
that the federal courts do not sit to correct generalized grievances 
and that not all deprivations of constitutional rights can be litigated 
in federal court. Though the federal courts have the power to protect 
rights that were recognized at common law or in the English Courts 
of Exchequer or Chancery, they are not ombudsmen with a general 
charter to police and enforce the Constitution.38 
                                                                                                             
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. at 2683–84; see also 28 U.S.C. § 530D(a) (2012). 
 33 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
 
 37 See id. at 480. 
 38 On several occasions, federal courts of various levels have made clear that 
their role in the American system of governance is of a limited nature. See, e.g., 
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The Constitution presumes that generalized grievances suffered 
equally by all taxpayers will be remedied by the political branches 
of the government.39 A court ruling in favor of a single taxpayer like 
Frothingham, who had challenged the constitutionality of a federal 
spending program, would be considered an advisory opinion, which 
is a judgment that does not enforce specific change, but rather ad-
vises on the constitutionality or interpretation of a law.40 Under Ar-
ticle III, the courts are not empowered to issue advisory opinions, 
and a judicial decision in Frothingham’s favor would have been 
purely speculative as to whether the ruling would have resulted in 
any actual change in Frothingham’s federal tax bill. 
The Court’s lack of power to issue advisory opinions is long es-
tablished and rooted in early American history. In an episode known 
as the Correspondence of the Justices,41 the U.S. Supreme Court was 
asked to give Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson legal advice about 
various abstract matters pertaining to U.S. foreign relations.42 The 
Supreme Court politely declined Jefferson’s invitation, saying that 
it lacked the power to adjudicate an issue unless there was a real, 
                                                                                                             
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 487 (1982) (“The federal courts were simply not constituted 
as ombudsmen of the general welfare.”); ACLU of Ohio Found., Inc. v. Ashbrook, 
375 F.3d 484, 499 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Supreme Court has specifically rejected 
the idea that the Constitution permits federal courts to adjudicate claims brought 
by . . . the ‘self-appointed Establishment Clause police’ . . . .”); Mazaleski v. 
Treusdell, 562 F.2d 701, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“Our legitimate role in a case such 
as this is necessarily a limited one. We must apply the Constitution, while care-
fully avoiding the temptation to act as ombudsmen . . . .”). 
 39 See Mellon, 262 U.S. at 482 (“But what burden is imposed upon the states, 
unequally or otherwise? Certainly there is none, unless it be the burden of taxa-
tion, and that falls upon their inhabitants, who are within the taxing power of Con-
gress as well as that of the states where they reside.”). 
 40 See id. at 485 (Thompson, J., concurring) (“[T]his court is as much without 
authority to pass abstract opinions upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress 
as it [is] . . . of state statutes.”). 
 41 MICHAEL STOKES PAULSEN ET AL., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 501–03 (2d ed. 2013) (discussing and reproducing the Correspondence of 
the Justices). 
 42 Id. 
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concrete controversy among legally adverse parties.43 In another ep-
isode from the 1790s, known as Hayburn’s Case,44 most of the U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices held that they lacked power under Article 
III to review judicially determined veterans’ pensions when the 
amounts in question could be raised or lowered by an executive 
branch official following the judicial review.45 In other words, Jus-
tices could only hear cases for which a judicial ruling would be sig-
nificantly likely to affect the concrete resolution for the involved 
parties.46 
It follows that the federal courts are empowered to hear only real 
and concrete disagreements between adverse litigants when there is 
a substantial likelihood that the judicial resolution of such disputes 
would impact the litigants.47 The injury suffered by Frothingham 
was not an injury that could be redressed by federal judicial action, 
nor was the injury in Massachusetts v. Mellon.48 Thus, States, like 
individual citizens, have no legal right under the Constitution to sue 
                                                                                                             
 43 Id. 
 44 2 U.S. 409 (1792); see also PAULSEN ET AL., supra note 52, at 496–501 
(discussing Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. 409). 
 45 Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. at 409, 413–14 n.4. 
 46 In Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), the U.S. Supreme Court made an 
exception to its rule against taxpayer standing in cases where a violation of the 
Establishment Clause was alleged. Many thought at the time that this was the 
opening salvo in an effort by the Warren Court to abolish standing doctrine across 
the board. The replacement of the Warren Court by the Burger and Rehnquist 
Courts left the traditional ban against taxpayer standing in place while allowing a 
Flast v. Cohen exception for Establishment Clause cases only. The Roberts Court 
appears to be close to overruling Flast v. Cohen, the reach of which it has greatly 
circumscribed. See Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 131 
S.Ct. 1436 (2011). 
 
 47 See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968) (“[T]he emphasis in 
standing problems is on whether the party invoking federal court jurisdiction has 
‘a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy,’ and whether the dispute 
touches upon ‘the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.’” (first 
quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962); and then quoting Aetna Life Ins. 
Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240–41 (1937))). 
 48 See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 478–80 (1923) (holding that 
the Court did not have jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of the Mater-
nity Act when no rights of the state were brought within the actual or threatened 
operation of the statute). 
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in federal court for the purpose of challenging the general constitu-
tionality of federal spending programs. 
The distinction between Frothingham and Windsor is that Wind-
sor did suffer a particularized, individual legal injury on account of 
§ 3 of DOMA.49 Unlike similarly situated married, heterosexual 
spouses, Windsor had to pay $363,053 in federal inheritance taxes 
as a result of DOMA’s exclusive definition of “marriage.”50 Wind-
sor’s injury was, therefore, not generally suffered by all taxpayers, 
and her payment of the tax could be resolved by actual remedy 
through a court order in her favor. For this reason, Windsor was an 
exception to the general rule against taxpayer standing, and she did 
have standing to challenge § 3 of DOMA in the district court. 
C.   The Obama Administration’s Lack of Federal Standing 
The district court ruled in Windsor’s favor and held that § 3 of 
DOMA was unconstitutional.51 The Obama Administration agreed, 
but appealed to the Second Circuit, apparently hoping to lose in a 
larger jurisdiction.52 The Second Circuit agreed that § 3 of DOMA 
was unconstitutional and affirmed, and the Obama Administration 
appealed again,53 this time to the U.S. Supreme Court, hoping to fi-
nally lose nationwide. The actions of the Obama Administration 
raise the question of whether a litigant can appeal a court judgment 
that he or she finds to be legally correct on the basis that complying 
with the judicial ruling would impose financial costs on the litigant. 
As exhibited by the Correspondence of the Justices, the federal 
courts have jurisdiction to hear only certain categories of “cases” 
and “controversies,”54 which involve legally adverse parties at all 
stages of litigation, including on appeal.55 In Windsor, the United 
States did not comply with the Court’s order that it pay Windsor a 
tax refund, though it agreed that Windsor was legally entitled to the 
                                                                                                             
 49 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2684–85 (2013). 
 50 Id. at 2683–84. 
 51 See Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), 
aff’d, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 52 See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 176–77 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 53 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684–86. 
 54 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 55 See PAULSEN ET AL., supra note 52, at 501–03. 
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refund.56 The majority in Windsor held that this was sufficient to 
give the United States standing to appeal the district court’s and Sec-
ond Circuit’s orders.57 As Justice Kennedy said: 
The judgment in question orders the United States to 
pay Windsor the refund she seeks. An order directing 
the Treasury to pay money is ‘a real and immediate 
economic injury,’ indeed as real and immediate as an 
order directing an individual to pay a tax. That the 
Executive may welcome this order to pay the refund 
if it is accompanied by the constitutional ruling it 
wants does not eliminate the injury to the national 
Treasury if payment is made, or to the taxpayer if it 
is not. The judgment orders the United States to pay 
money that it would not disburse but for the court’s 
order. . . . Windsor’s ongoing claim for funds that the 
United States refuses to pay thus establishes a con-
troversy sufficient for Article III jurisdiction.58 
The majority argued that the financial cost of the refund sufficed 
as an injury incurred by the United States, satisfying the prerequisite 
of “controversy”;59 however, this argument is flawed because the 
United States did not take the position that it was legally injured by 
the district court’s or Second Circuit’s orders to refund Windsor. 
Though there did exist a controversy between the United States and 
Windsor because the Obama Administration refused to follow the 
law as ordered by the courts, there was no controversy between the 
parties over what the law entailed. Both parties agreed that the 
United States was legally obligated to pay Windsor $363,053, and 
there is no federal judicial power to review the correctness of a dis-
trict court’s decision unless the United States explicitly asks the 
court to do so. Here, the United States did not make such a request 
of the Court. 
The United States’ failure to follow through with obeying the 
district court’s judgments may have created enough adverseness to 
support appellate jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus directing 
                                                                                                             
 56 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684–86. 
 57 Id. at 2688–89. 
 58 Id. at 2686 (citation omitted). 
 59 See id. at 2685–86. 
2016] THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE CASES AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION 721 
 
the government to pay Windsor. That Windsor was injured by the 
United States’ failure to pay means that there was federal judicial 
power to enforce the district court’s judgment.60 Nonetheless, it does 
not follow that such a failure would have also created jurisdiction 
for the Court to revisit the question of whether the United States’ 
denial of the refund was constitutional. Accordingly, there was no 
case or controversy here. Windsor was a feigned case by the Obama 
Administration seeking an advisory opinion, just like the Corre-
spondence of the Justices and Hayburn’s Case. 
As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent, the majority erred 
because it assumed it is the province and duty of the judiciary to 
always declare the law,61 as asserted in Marbury v. Madison.62 How-
ever, the statement in Marbury was made in the context of the U.S. 
Supreme Court having to decide a bona fide case or controversy that 
was already properly before the Court.63 In the setting of such a bona 
fide case or controversy, it is indeed the province and duty of the 
judiciary to determine the law. Nevertheless, the issue in Windsor 
was whether such a bona fide case or controversy even existed, so 
the Marbury dicta could not apply. 
The majority also assumed that the federal courts have jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate any question of United States constitutional mean-
ing, and, as Justice Scalia argued, this concept, too, is mistaken.64 
As is made clear in Frothingham and Mellon, there are many ques-
tions of constitutional meaning that are not justiciable by the federal 
courts and that, therefore, must be left to the political branches of 
government.65 American-style judicial review does not empower the 
                                                                                                             
 60 See id. 
 61 See id. at 2697–2703 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We have no power to decide 
this case.”). 
 62 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
 63 See id. at 147–49. 
 64 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2697–2703 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 65 See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 600 
(2007) (Alito, J.) (“Because the interests of the taxpayer are, in essence, the inter-
ests of the public at large, deciding a constitutional claim based solely on taxpayer 
standing ‘would be[,] not to decide a judicial controversy, but to assume a position 
of authority over the governmental acts of another and co-equal department, an 
authority which plainly we do not possess.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Mas-
sachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 489 (1923))); see also Lujan v. Defs. of Wild-
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United States Supreme Court to enforce or interpret the Constitution 
in the way that constitutional courts are so empowered in Germany 
or in other foreign nations.66 There is no judicial review clause or 
constitutional interpretation clause in the U.S. Constitution, and Ar-
ticle III empowers the federal courts to decide only “cases” or “con-
troversies” using the “judicial” power.67 Windsor did not present a 
case or controversy about § 3 of DOMA because the United States 
agreed with the judgments delivered by the courts below, and there 
is no standing for a party to appeal a court judgment with which it 
agrees, seeking to lose again on appeal in a grander arena. 
D.   BLAG’s Lack of Federal Standing 
1. THE U.S. CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR 
LEGISLATIVE STANDING 
Justice Alito agreed with Justice Scalia that the Obama Admin-
istration lacked standing to appeal Windsor, but he took the position 
that BLAG had standing to appeal the Second Circuit’s judgment 
because a majority of the House of Representatives approved the 
appeal.68 Justice Alito asserted that each House of Congress has a 
                                                                                                             
life, 504 U.S. 555, 559–66, 576 (1992) (denying standing to environmental pro-
tection groups challenging a regulation of the Secretary of the Interior for failure 
to sufficiently assert personal injury, and noting that “[v]indicating the public in-
terest (including the public interest in Government observance of the Constitution 
and laws) is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive” (emphasis in orig-
inal)); Ala. Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 479 (1938) (“[T]he courts have no 
power to consider in isolation and annul an act of Congress on the ground that it 
is unconstitutional; but may consider that question ‘only when the justification for 
some direct injury suffered or threatened, presenting a justiciable issue, is made 
to rest upon such an act.’”). 
 66 See Ronald L. Watts, The Political Use or Abuse of Courts in Federal Sys-
tems, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 509, 514–19 (1998). 
 67 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 68 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2711–14 (Alito, J., dissenting). In this view, the 
case involved three parties, two of which are the United States: the House of Rep-
resentatives v. Windsor and he Executive Branch. While the President found 
DOMA unconstitutional, the House of Representatives disagreed and fought for 
DOMA’s defense. However, the power to defend federal legislation in court lies 
outside the power of Congress for good reason. A power for Congress to defend 
its own laws would upset the balance of powers laid out by the Constitution. The 
principle of the separation of powers is essential to our country’s foundation, as 
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judicially cognizable interest in defending the constitutionality of 
federal laws in federal court when the President finds the laws un-
constitutional and declines their enforcement.69 In this way, Justice 
Alito seemingly shares in Justice Kennedy’s presumption that fed-
eral courts have the same power enjoyed by constitutional courts in 
other countries to interpret and enforce the Constitution in all con-
texts, and this view is deeply mistaken. 
The United States federal courts were not set up to be constitu-
tional ombudsmen, or public advocates charged with investigating 
and addressing complaints of maladministration. There is no clause 
in Article III that can be plausibly read to be so empowering, as Ar-
ticle III grants to federal courts the power to hear six enumerated 
categories of controversies, including controversies to which the 
United States is a party and controversies among two or more states. 
The six controversies stipulated in Article III, Section 2 are as fol-
lows: 
The Judicial Power shall extend . . . to Controversies 
to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Con-
troversies between two or more States; between a 
State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens 
of different States,—between Citizens of the same 
State claiming Land under Grants of different States, 
and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and for-
eign States, Citizens or Subjects.70 
Conspicuously missing from this list are controversies between 
either House of Congress and the President as to whether a law is 
constitutional. By enumerating the categories of cases that federal 
courts have the power to hear, Article III deliberately withholds ju-
risdiction over other types of controversies, including controversies 
                                                                                                             
Madison said in Federalist No. 47: “No political truth is certainly of greater in-
trinsic value, or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of lib-
erty . . . .” THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 271 (James Madison) (Am. Bar Ass’n ed., 
2009). 
 69 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2712–14 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 70 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
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arising when the Executive declines to defend the constitutionality 
of a federal law.71 
Many foreign constitutions provide for the standing of individ-
ual legislators or a certain number of legislators to challenge the 
constitutionality of a law or an executive-branch action, but the U.S. 
Constitution does not so provide. Consider, for example, Article 93 
of the German Basic Law, which sets out the jurisdiction of the Ger-
man Constitutional Court. Article 93 explicitly states: 
The Federal Constitutional Court shall rule: 
. . . . 
2. in the event of disagreements or doubts concerning 
the formal or substantive compatibility of federal law 
or Land law with this Basic Law, or the compatibility 
of Land law with other federal law, on application of 
the Federal Government, of a Land government, or 
of one fourth of the Members of the Bundestag; 
. . . . 
3. in the event of disagreements concerning the rights 
and duties of the Federation and the Länder, espe-
cially in the execution of federal law by the Länder 
and in the exercise of federal oversight; 
4. on other disputes involving public law between the 
Federation and the Länder, between different Län-
der, or within a Land, unless there is recourse to an-
other court; 
4a. on constitutional complaints, which may be filed 
by any person alleging that one of his basic rights or 
one of his rights under paragraph (4) of Article 20 or 
under Article 33, 38, 101, 103 or 104 has been in-
fringed by public authority . . . .72 
                                                                                                             
 71 See Expressio unius est exclusion alterius, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014) (“The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.”). 
 72 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], Article 93, translation at 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html. 
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The German Basic Law differs from Article III of the U.S. Con-
stitution by explicitly empowering one fourth of the members of the 
Bundestag, the lower House of the German parliament, to sue in the 
Constitutional Court when a question arises regarding the constitu-
tionality of a federal law. 
Similarly, under French law, sixty members of either the Senate 
or the National Assembly have standing to challenge the constitu-
tionality of a proposed law before the French Constitutional Coun-
cil. Article 61 of the French Constitution of the Fifth Republic ex-
plicitly provides that: “Acts of Parliament may be referred to the 
Constitutional Council, before their promulgation, by the President 
of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the President of the National 
Assembly, the President of the Senate, sixty Members of the Na-
tional Assembly or sixty Senators.”73 
The French and German constitutions are thus quite clear in 
providing legislators with standing to raise constitutional challenges 
before their respective constitutional courts. However, there is no 
analogous clause in Article III of the U.S. Constitution granting fed-
eral courts this power. 
Precedent also demonstrates that the U.S. Supreme Court does 
not generally review cases like those suggested by Justice Alito. In 
Raines v. Byrd, the Court held that individual members of Congress 
lacked standing to bring constitutional challenges,74 and in his con-
currence in Goldwater v. Carter, Justice Powell stated that a suit 
brought by a single member of the Senate was not even ripe because 
there was no controversy between the President and the Senate until 
the latter, by majority action, brought suit.75 If the Executive fails to 
fulfill his duties, the Constitution does provide for appropriate Con-
gressional responses. Congress can act by impeaching the President, 
holding oversight hearings, and cutting off appropriations. 
However, 226 years of almost unbroken constitutional practice 
suggests the intended application of Article III’s plain text.76 The 
federal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear “controversies” be-
tween Congress and the Executive, nor does Congress have power 
                                                                                                             
 73 1958 CONST. art. 61 (Fr.). 
 74 521 U.S. 811, 830 (1997). 
 75 444 U.S. 996, 997–98 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring). 
 76 See generally Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. 409 (1792). 
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to sue the President over his exercise of law-enforcement discretion. 
As legislative standing to sue is absent from Article III’s enumerated 
categories, federal courts do not have the jurisdiction to hear the 
kind of cases that Justice Alito suggested regarding BLAG. For this 
reason, Justice Alito’s concurrence is flatly contradicted by the plain 
text of Article III; an issue he fails to address in his opinion.77 
It becomes even more difficult to understand Justice Alito’s 
opinion regarding BLAG’s standing in the context of his rejection 
of Massachusetts’s standing in Massachusetts v. Mellon and Massa-
chusetts v. EPA.78 In Mellon, the Supreme Court considered a claim 
of federal jurisdiction between Massachusetts and the federal gov-
ernment, when Massachusetts claimed that Congress was spending 
money unconstitutionally.79 The states, like the House of Represent-
atives, are institutional, governing bodies, which, under German 
constitutional law, have standing to raise constitutional claims.80 
However, the Supreme Court in Mellon held that the states have no 
standing under the U.S. Constitution to bring suit.81 Justice Alito 
agreed with this holding in Massachusetts v. EPA, when he joined 
the dissents authored by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia, 
both of which argued against state standing.82 The claim for Massa-
chusetts State standing is arguably analogous to BLAG’s claim for 
standing to appeal, yet Justice Alito found standing for BLAG. This 
inconsistency makes Justice Alito’s opinion in Windsor unclear. 
2. CASES BETWEEN POLITICAL BRANCHES ARE NOT “LAW OR 
EQUITY” SUITS 
Since, hypothetically, a suit by Congress against the President 
would revolve around federal law, it is likely that Justice Alito found 
standing for BLAG and the House of Representatives because he 
thought the case to be one “in law and equity.” However, Article III 
                                                                                                             
 77 For more debate on whether a single house of Congress has standing to 
bring a federal case, see Tara Leigh Grove & Neal Devins, Congress’s (Limited) 
Power to Represent Itself in Court, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 571 (2014). 
 78 See generally Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 79 See 262 U.S. 447, 478–79 (1923). 
 80 See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], Article 93. 
 81 See 262 U.S. at 480–89. 
 82 See 549 U.S. at 535–49 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 549–560 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). 
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unequivocally states that “[c]ases affecting [a]mbassadors, other 
public [m]inisters and [c]onsuls . . .” and “[c]ases of admiralty and 
maritime [j]urisdiction . . .” are not “cases in law and equity,” even 
though they may arise under federal law.83 
The historical reasoning for this jurisdictional distinction is 
rooted in the British court system. In our opinion, based on Professor 
Calabresi’s knowledge of English legal history in 1787, admiralty 
cases in Great Britain were heard by special admiralty courts with-
out jury trials; “cases in law” were heard by the Court of King’s 
Bench, the Court of Common Pleas, and the Court of Exchequer; 
and “cases in equity” were heard by the Court of Chancery and the 
Court of Exchequer.84 Neither the Law Courts nor the Court of 
Chancery had jurisdiction to hear lawsuits brought by a House of 
Parliament against the King for the King’s failure to faithfully exe-
cute Parliament’s acts.85 It thus makes sense that, in his opinion, Jus-
tice Alito did not point to an instance from 1789 to the present day 
in which the federal courts heard a case like the controversy he sug-
gested between BLAG and Windsor. Such a case could never have 
been heard, either in England or in the United States. 
There is one prior United States Supreme Court precedent, INS 
v. Chadha, in which the House of Representatives did have standing 
to challenge an executive branch failure to execute a law.86 In 
Chadha, the INS gave Jagdish Rai Chadha a stay of an order of de-
portation, and the House of Representatives purported to veto the 
                                                                                                             
 83 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 84 See generally JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENEE LETTOW LERNER, & BRUCE P. 
SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-
AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (2009). 
 85 In fact, neither the Law Courts nor the Court of Chancery had jurisdiction 
to hear cases of impeachment. The House of Commons had the sole power to 
initiate impeachments, and the House of Lords had the sole power to try them. 
The Law Courts and the Courts of Chancery and Exchequer could not review such 
cases, which helps explain why the U.S. Supreme Court was right in United States 
v. Nixon to rule that impeachment cases in the United States raise a political ques-
tion, which the federal courts do not have jurisdiction to resolve, even though they 
arise under federal law. See generally 418 U.S. 683 (1974). Thus, Article III of 
the Constitution does not give federal courts jurisdiction to hear cases of impeach-
ment that arise under federal law, and Article I gives the “sole” power to initiate 
such cases to the House of Representatives and the “sole” power to try them to 
the Senate. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3. 
 86 462 U.S. 919, 935–36 (1983). 
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stay of deportation pursuant to a statute that provided for a one-
chamber legislative veto.87 The Court found that it had jurisdiction 
to hear this case and held on the merits that all legislative vetoes are 
unconstitutional.88 
The Chadha case is easily distinguishable from Windsor. In 
Chadha, each chamber of Congress had a statutory right to veto ex-
ecutive branch actions, and the executive branch disagreed, arguing 
that legislative vetoes were unconstitutional.89 Each chamber of 
Congress thus suffered a legal injury in Chadha through the depri-
vation of a legal right explicitly conferred upon Congress by federal 
statutory law.90 In contrast, the two chambers of Congress in Wind-
sor did not have a statutory legal right to sue in federal court when 
the President declined to execute a law that he thought was uncon-
stitutional. The House of Representatives can impeach a President 
who it thinks is not faithfully executing the law, but it cannot sue 
him seeking an injunction from a court anymore than the State of 
Massachusetts can sue the federal government over an unconstitu-
tional spending bill or over the EPA’s exercise of its law-enforce-
ment discretion. 
3. THE PRESIDENTIAL DUTY 
Article II, Section III, of the U.S. Constitution obligates the Pres-
ident to “take [c]are that the [l]aws be faithfully executed . . . .”91 
Then, Article VI says that “[t]his Constitution, and the [l]aws of the 
United States which shall be made in pursuance [t]hereof . . . shall 
be the supreme [l]aw of the [l]and; and the [j]udges in every [s]tate 
shall be bound thereby, any [t]hing in the Constitution or [l]aws of 
any State to the [c]ontrary notwithstanding.”92 
Thus, the term “laws” in Article II encompasses the federal stat-
utes and the U.S. Constitution, and the President has both the right 
                                                                                                             
 87 See id. at 923–28. 
 88 See id. at 929–44. 
 89 See id. at 925, 957–58. 
 90 See id. at 951–59. 
 91 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 92 U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
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and the duty to enforce the Constitution in accordance with his in-
terpretation.93 Therefore, President Obama fulfilled his duty by find-
ing § 3 of DOMA unconstitutional in Windsor, and he stayed faithful 
to his understanding of the Constitution by refusing to defend 
DOMA in court.94 
The President is an independent interpreter of the Constitution 
and must read the Constitution without regard to the contrary views 
of Congress or the U.S. Supreme Court. As President Andrew Jack-
son said in vetoing the Bank of the United States on constitutional 
grounds in 1832, notwithstanding the U.S. Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in McCulloch v. Maryland95: 
The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must 
each for itself be guided by its own opinion of the 
Constitution. Each public officer who takes an oath 
to support the Constitution swears that he will sup-
port it as he understands it, and not as it is understood 
by others. It is as much the duty of the House of Rep-
resentatives, of the Senate, and of the President to de-
cide upon the constitutionality of any bill or resolu-
tion which may be presented to them for passage or 
approval as it is of the supreme judges when it may 
be brought before them for judicial decision. The 
opinion of the judges has no more authority over 
Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the 
                                                                                                             
 93 See generally United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974) (“In the 
performance of assigned constitutional duties each branch of the Government 
must initially interpret the Constitution, and the interpretation of its powers by 
any branch is due great respect from the others.” (emphasis added)); John Harri-
son, The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in Interpreting the Con-
stitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 371 (1988) (discussing the President’s obligation 
to comply with the courts’ judgments but not with the courts’ interpretation of the 
law, evidenced by precedent); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 
1219 n.4 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (“[E]xecutive officials nec-
essarily interpret the laws they enforce . . . .”). 
 94 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2684–85 (2013). 
 95 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
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judges, and on that point the President is independent 
of both.96 
Hence, the enumerated power in Article II, Section III, imposes 
a duty on the President to execute laws that he or she believes to be 
constitutional, not laws that Congress believes to be constitutional. 
4. WHY COLEMAN V. MILLER IS UNRELIABLE 
Justice Alito relied on one final case to support his argument that 
BLAG had standing to appeal in Windsor: Coleman v. Miller, which 
was decided in 1939.97 In Coleman, Chief Justice Hughes, writing 
for himself, Justice Stone, and Justice Reed, concluded that a major-
ity of the Kansas State Senate had standing in federal court to litigate 
the constitutionality of Kansas’s ratification of an amendment to the 
federal constitution.98 The two dissenters, Justice Butler joined by 
Justice McReynolds, also agreed that there was standing.99 How-
ever, Justices Frankfurter, Black, Roberts, and Douglas wrote sepa-
rately in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter asserting that the Kansas 
State senators did not have standing to sue in this case.100 These 
same four Justices also joined an opinion by Justice Black saying 
that this case raised a non-justiciable political question.101 
To be blunt, a 5–4 standing holding from 1939 that was depend-
ent on the votes of four pre-New Deal Supreme Court Justices is a 
dubious source of legal authority at best, especially in the face of the 
contrary opinion by Justices Frankfurter, Roberts, Black, and Doug-
las. The standing holding of Coleman is not well-reasoned and has 
barely been followed.102 As a general matter, neither state nor fed-
eral majorities of legislative houses have brought lawsuits in the fed-
eral courts. Article III simply does not create federal jurisdiction 
over these kinds of controversies. 
                                                                                                             
 96 PAULSEN ET AL., supra note 52, at 68 (quoting at length President Jackson’s 
message vetoing the bill that would have renewed the Bank of the United States). 
 97 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2713 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also Coleman v. 
Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). 
 98 See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 456. 
 99 See id. at 470–74. 
 100 See id. at 460–70. 
 101 See id. at 457–60. 
 102 See generally Note, Standing in the Way of Separation of Powers: The 
Consequences of Raines v. Byrd, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1741, 1744 (1999). 
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5. CONCLUSION ON BLAG’S LACK OF STANDING 
Given the text of Article III and the last 226 years of practice, 
we think Justice Alito’s argument for BLAG’s standing is poorly 
reasoned and unpersuasive. If followed, it would revolutionize our 
form of government by inserting the federal courts into the middle 
of political disputes between the President and the two houses of 
Congress over how to best execute the laws. This is not a road the 
U.S. Supreme Court ought to follow. 
E.   Prudential Standing Principles 
The final argument for standing in Windsor is Justice Kennedy’s 
claim that prudential standing principles suggest federal jurisdiction 
be exercised here.103 This argument also fails. The prudential limits 
on standing in the federal courts are judicially created doctrines—
which can be overridden by Congress—that generally bar third-
party standing and the litigation of both generalized grievances that 
are shared by all citizens and statutory matters that are not within 
the zone of interest of a statute.104 Congress cannot override the core 
Article III standing requirements, which are implicit in the case or 
controversy requirement, and the federal courts have no power to 
waive standing rules for prudential reasons merely because the Jus-
tices want to hear a particular case. 
F.   Considering “Legal Injury” 
The Court has said that Article III allows a litigant to have stand-
ing to sue in federal court only when a party has suffered a “legal 
injury” that is: 1) “concrete and particularized”; 2) “actual and im-
minent, not conjectural or hypothetical”; 3) “fairly traceable to the 
challenged action of the defendant”; and 4) likely to be prevented or 
redressed by a favorable judicial decision.105 As discussed above, 
Windsor suffered such a legal injury when she was denied a spousal 
exemption from the inheritance tax.106 The United States, however, 
did not suffer a legal injury when the district court agreed with the 
                                                                                                             
 103 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2685–86. 
 104 See Luke Meier, Using Tort Law to Understand the Causation Prong of 
Standing, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1241, 1243 n.4, 1266 (2011). 
 105 See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (citation omit-
ted). 
 106 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2685–86. 
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Obama Administration and ruled that § 3 of DOMA was unconsti-
tutional. 
In our opinion, a party cannot be legally injured by a court ruling 
that he or she supports, even if complying with that decision imposes 
financial costs on the party. Similarly, a party cannot appeal from a 
decision that he or she supports with the hopes of losing in a larger 
jurisdiction.107 Consider, for example, the case of a taxpayer who 
agrees with the federal government that he owes the IRS $35,000 in 
income taxes. Such a taxpayer does not have standing to sue the 
government, even though compliance with the tax code will cost 
him $35,000. A taxpayer does not suffer a “legal injury” when he is 
assessed for taxes that he agrees he owes, and there is an important 
distinction between actions that may “harm” or “burden” an individ-
ual and actions that do cause “legal injury.” 
The United States did not suffer a “legal injury” when the district 
court ruled that the United States owed Windsor a $363,053 tax re-
fund precisely because the Obama Administration agreed with the 
Court’s determination. Absent a legal injury, the United States did 
not have standing to appeal to the Second Circuit or to the United 
States Supreme Court. The United States’ failure to pay Windsor 
only meant that Windsor had standing to request the issuance of a 
writ of mandamus, ordering that she finally be paid the refund. 
II.   THE THIRD-PARTY APPELLANTS IN HOLLINGSWORTH 
LACKED FEDERAL STANDING 
A.   Hollingsworth Procedural History 
The lawsuit in Hollingsworth v. Perry108 originated after the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court held, in 2008, that a California ban on same-
sex marriage violated the Equal Protection Clause of the California 
                                                                                                             
 107 See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank of Jackson v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333–34 
(1980) (“Ordinarily, only a party aggrieved by a judgment or order of a district 
court may exercise the statutory right to appeal therefrom.” However, “[i]n an 
appropriate case, appeal may be permitted from an adverse ruling collateral to the 
judgment on the merits at the behest of the party who has prevailed on the merits, 
so long as that party retains a stake in the appeal satisfying the requirements of 
Art. III.”). 
 108 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
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Constitution.109 In the wake of the ruling, a number of same-sex cou-
ples were legally married in California; however, later that year, 
California voters passed Proposition 8, a statewide initiative that 
amended the California State Constitution to again ban same-sex 
marriage.110 In response to the ban, two same-sex couples, Kristin 
Perry and Sandra Stier, and Paul Katami and Jeffrey Zarrillo, 
brought this lawsuit in federal district court after being prohibited to 
marry by California state officials.111 
Though the California Governor and State Attorney General re-
fused to defend the constitutionality of Proposition 8 in court, the 
district court permitted the official proponents of the initiative, 
which included State Senator Dennis Hollingsworth, to do so as in-
tervenors.112 Ultimately, the district court held Proposition 8 to be 
unconstitutional, and the Governor and Attorney General of Califor-
nia declined to appeal.113 Nonetheless, Hollingsworth and a bevy of 
private busybodies did purport114 to appeal to the Ninth Circuit to 
defend the constitutionality of the proposition.115 
The Ninth Circuit doubted whether Hollingsworth had standing 
to appeal the district court ruling and, thus, certified the following 
question to the California State Supreme Court: 
Whether under Article II, Section 8 of the California 
Constitution, or otherwise under California law, the 
official proponents of an initiative measure possess 
either a particularized interest in the initiative’s va-
lidity or the authority to assert the State’s interest in 
the initiative’s validity, which would enable them to 
defend the constitutionality of the initiative upon its 
                                                                                                             
 109 See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
 110 See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927–28 (N.D. Cal. 
2010). 
 111 Id. at 927. 
 112 Id. at 928. 
 113 See id. at 1003. 
 114 In Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, the Justices raised doubts that 
initiative proponents “have a quasi-legislative interest in defending the constitu-
tionality of the measure they successfully sponsored.” 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997). 
 115 See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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adoption or appeal a judgment invalidating the initi-
ative, when the public officials charged with that 
duty refuse to do so.116 
The California Supreme Court ruled that Hollingsworth did have 
standing to appeal the district court’s order, and the Ninth Circuit 
accepted that conclusion and ruled in favor of Perry’s same-sex mar-
riage claim.117 Hollingsworth then appealed the Ninth Circuit ruling 
to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.118 
B.   Hollingsworth’s Lack of Standing 
Reflecting on the Court’s definition of “legal injury” discussed 
in Part II, it is quite clear that Hollingsworth, as a third party to the 
litigation, did not suffer such a legal injury. This poses the question 
of whether a third party may sue in federal court seeking enforce-
ment of a federal statute, to which we answer no. In this Part, we 
argue that the U.S. Supreme Court was correct in overruling the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court’s finding of standing. Third parties are not 
empowered to seek enforcement of federal law, and thus, Hol-
lingsworth did not have standing to sue in federal court. 
1. LAW ENFORCEMENT IS THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF THE 
EXECUTIVE 
The power to enforce criminal law is exclusive to the Executive 
branch, as federal and state prosecutors are a part of their respective 
executive branches.119 For example, it is an axiom of standing law 
that crime victims do not have standing to request a judicial order 
directing state or federal prosecutors to prosecute a particular indi-
vidual.120   In the seminal case of United States v. Cox,121 the Fifth 
Circuit held that a federal district judge could not jail the U.S. At-
torney or Acting Attorney General of the United States, Nicholas 
deB. Katzenbach, simply because the attorneys refused to bring a 
                                                                                                             
 116 Id. 
 117 Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1064, 1070–72 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 118 See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013). 
 119 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92–93 (1789). 
 120 Only a U.S. Attorney has standing to initiate a federal prosecution. United 
States v. Cox, 342 F2d. 167 (5th Cir. 1965). 
 
 121 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1965). 
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federal prosecution against two African American civil rights work-
ers whom the district judge wanted to see prosecuted.122 The Fifth 
Circuit held that the Executive branch had judicially unreviewable 
discretion to refuse to bring criminal prosecution where it believed 
such action would be unjust;123 this holding is also supported by At-
torney General Roger B. Taney’s Opinion on the Jewels of the Prin-
cess of Orange.124 President Thomas Jefferson also supported this 
decision when he ordered that the prosecution of William Duane for 
violating the Sedition Act of 1798 be dropped on the grounds that 
the statute was unconstitutional.125 President Jefferson defended his 
decision by writing the following: 
The President is to have the laws executed. He may 
order an offense then to be prosecuted. If he sees a 
prosecution put into a train which is not lawful, he 
may order it to be discontinued and put into a legal 
train. . . . There appears to be no weak part in any of 
these positions or inferences.126 
It follows that no third party has standing to challenge a presi-
dential or Justice Department decision to forego a prosecution. Be-
fore federal death-row prisoner Gary Gilmore was executed by a fir-
ing squad in 1977, his mother was denied standing when she at-
tempted to argue that the execution was cruel and unusual under the 
Eighth Amendment.127 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that it was 
Gary Gilmore’s exclusive right to bring the claim, that Gilmore 
waived that right by asking to be executed, and that his mother 
lacked standing to raise the claim on his behalf.128 Only a federal 
                                                                                                             
 122 See id. at 171–72. 
 123 See id. 
 124 See 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 482 (1831), 1831 WL 995; see also PAULSEN ET AL., 
supra note 52, at 319–21. 
 125 See PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, REPRESSIVE JURISPRUDENCE IN THE EARLY 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE LEGACY OF ENGLISH 
LAW 116–22 (2010). 
 126 PAULSEN ET AL., supra note 52, at 318. 
 127 See Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1014–15 (1976) (Burger, C.J., con-
curring); see also id. at 1017 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 128 See id. at 1014–15 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
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defendant who is prosecuted has standing to raise constitutional ar-
guments in his or her defense; this rule also pertains to state criminal 
prosecutions.129 
Third parties also lack standing to sue for the enforcement of 
other federal or state laws when the government denies their en-
forcement. This point is illustrated by the response to President 
Obama’s recent executive action. On June 15, 2012, the President 
ordered that the removal provisions of the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act (INA) not be enforced against an estimated population of 
between 800,000 and 1.4 million individuals who were illegally pre-
sent in the United States.130 This unilateral exercise of presidential 
prosecutorial discretion had the effect of writing into federal law the 
so-called “DREAM Act,”131 a bill consistently blocked by Congress 
since 2001. Notwithstanding the dramatic scope of the President’s 
action, the deportation advocates do not have standing to challenge 
the President’s action in federal court. Although private litigants 
may be dismayed by presidential exercises of law enforcement dis-
cretion, such parties are not “legally injured” by the executive action 
and, therefore, have no legal right to sue over the Executive’s exer-
cise of prosecutorial discretion. 
These same principles apply to State Senator Hollingsworth’s 
attempt to appeal the district court’s holding that California’s Prop-
osition 8 was unconstitutional when neither the Governor nor the 
Attorney General of California agreed to enforce the law.132 Article 
V, Section 1 of the California Constitution provides as follows: “The 
supreme executive power of this State is vested in the Governor. The 
Governor shall see that the law is faithfully executed.”133 Article V, 
Section 13 follows with the powers of the Attorney General of Cal-
ifornia: 
Subject to the powers and duties of the Governor, the 
Attorney General shall be the chief law officer of the 
                                                                                                             
 129 See generally id. at 1014–17 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
 130 Julia Preston & John H. Cushman Jr., Obama to Permit Young Migrants to 
Remain in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2012, http://www.ny-
times.com/2012/06/16/us/us-to-stop-deporting-some-illegal-immi-
grants.html?_r=0. 
 131 See DREAM Act of 2010, S. 3992, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 132 See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661–63 (2013). 
 133 CAL. CONST. art. V, § 1. 
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State. It shall be the duty of the Attorney General to 
see that the laws of the State are uniformly and ade-
quately enforced. The Attorney General shall have 
direct supervision over every district attorney and 
sheriff and over such other law enforcement officers 
as may be designated by law, in all matters pertaining 
to the duties of their respective offices, and may re-
quire any of said officers to make reports concerning 
the investigation, detection, prosecution, and punish-
ment of crime in their respective jurisdictions as to 
the Attorney General may seem advisable. Whenever 
in the opinion of the Attorney General any law of the 
State is not being adequately enforced in any county, 
it shall be the duty of the Attorney General to prose-
cute any violations of law of which the superior court 
shall have jurisdiction, and in such cases the Attor-
ney General shall have all the powers of a district at-
torney. When required by the public interest or di-
rected by the Governor, the Attorney General shall 
assist any district attorney in the discharge of the du-
ties of that office.134 
It is unquestionable whether the Governor and Attorney General 
of California have the exclusive right to execute—or to direct the 
execution of—all laws, criminal and civil, in the State of California. 
Indeed, the Governor has the explicit power and duty to make sure 
“that the law is faithfully executed,” and no third parties can legally 
assume this role. 
2. HOLLINGSWORTH DID NOT SUFFER A LEGAL INJURY 
The “legal injury” claimed by Hollingsworth is not the sort of 
traditional legal injury for which litigants in federal court have ever 
been entitled to sue in American history. Hollingsworth alleged to 
have suffered an injury when same-sex couples were granted mar-
riage licenses in California in defiance of Proposition 8; however, 
the federal courts do not generally allow people to sue when they 
                                                                                                             
 134 Id. § 13. 
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are disgruntled by another’s matrimony.135 If our child or close 
friend chooses to marry someone of whom we disapprove, we may 
be very upset, but this discontent does not amount to “a legal injury” 
over which we can sue in federal court. Not a single reported case 
grants an individual standing to sue for having morally disapproved 
of the marriage of another couple. A litigant would not be deemed 
to have suffered a legal injury in this setting, unless there was big-
amy or incest involved, and even then, a court proceeding would 
almost certainly take place through a criminal trial in which the State 
Attorney General and Governor would participate. Otherwise, a pri-
vate suit challenging a specific couple’s marriage would be dis-
missed because the plaintiff had not suffered a legally cognizable 
injury. 
Hollingsworth might have claimed another injury—that their 
state constitutional right to amend the state’s constitution through 
the initiative process was denied when the Governor and Attorney 
General of California refused to defend Proposition 8. This claim, 
too, would fail. Article II, Section 8 of the California State Consti-
tution sets out most of the provisions that govern a citizen’s right to 
legislate by initiative.136 It provides as follows: 
(a) The initiative is the power of the electors to pro-
pose statutes and amendments to the Constitution 
and to adopt or reject them. 
(b) An initiative measure may be proposed by pre-
senting to the Secretary of State a petition that sets 
forth the text of the proposed statute or amendment 
to the Constitution and is certified to have been 
signed by electors equal in number to 5 percent in the 
case of a statute, and 8 percent in the case of an 
amendment to the Constitution, of the votes for all 
                                                                                                             
 135 See, e.g., Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2664 (“For the reasons we have ex-
plained, petitioners have likewise not suffered an injury in fact, and therefore 
would ordinarily have no standing to assert the State’s interests.”); id. at 2668 
(“We have never before upheld the standing of a private party to defend the con-
stitutionality of a state statute when state officials have chosen not to. We decline 
to do so for the first time here.”). 
 136 See generally CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8. 
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candidates for Governor at the last gubernatorial 
election. 
(c) The Secretary of State shall then submit the meas-
ure at the next general election held at least 131 days 
after it qualifies or at any special statewide election 
held prior to that general election. The Governor may 
call a special statewide election for the measure. 
(d) An initiative measure embracing more than one 
subject may not be submitted to the electors or have 
any effect. 
(e) An initiative measure may not include or exclude 
any political subdivision of the State from the appli-
cation or effect of its provisions based upon approval 
or disapproval of the initiative measure, or based 
upon the casting of a specified percentage of votes in 
favor of the measure, by the electors of that political 
subdivision. 
(f) An initiative measure may not contain alternative 
or cumulative provisions wherein one or more of 
those provisions would become law depending upon 
the casting of a specified percentage of votes for or 
against the measure.137 
Nowhere does this section suggest that the proponents of an in-
itiative in California have the legal right to defend its constitution-
ality in federal court when the Governor and Attorney General of 
the State decline to do so. 
Despite this, the California Supreme Court did hold in Perry v. 
Brown138 that the proponents of Proposition 8 had standing “under 
California law to appear and assert the state’s interest in the initia-
tive’s validity and to appeal a judgment invalidating the measure 
when the public officials who ordinarily defend the measure or ap-
peal such a judgment decline to do so.”139 The Supreme Court of 
                                                                                                             
 137 Id. 
 138 265 P.3d 1002 (Cal. 2011). 
 139 Id. at 1007. 
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California based its decision on the California Elections Code and 
Article II, Section 8, of the California Constitution.140 However, the 
plain language of Article II, Section 8 in no way supports the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court’s holding. The federal Constitution does not 
provide for state initiatives and referenda, nor does it give the pro-
ponents of such measures standing to defend them in federal court. 
To the extent that the Constitution does address the constitutional 
questions that are raised by initiatives and referenda, it does so in 
Article IV, Section 4, which states: “The United States shall guar-
antee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Govern-
ment, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Ap-
plication of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legisla-
ture cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.”141 
In Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon,142 the 
U.S. Supreme Court reached the dubious conclusion that the consti-
tutionality of direct democracy via initiatives and referenda raised a 
political question insofar as it was inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion’s guarantee of a republican form of government.143 However, 
the holding in Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. did not 
justify standing for Hollingsworth to file suit in federal court. The 
right of California citizens to legislate through initiatives and refer-
enda, as stipulated by the California Constitution, does not include 
an express right of action for privately interested parties to defend 
the constitutionality of such initiatives and referenda when the Gov-
ernor and Attorney General so decline.144 The California Supreme 
Court may be willing to engage in such free-style constitution re-
writing, but there is no reason why the federal courts, being tribunals 
of limited jurisdiction, should defer to the California Supreme Court 
on this issue. Imagine for a moment what would likely proceed if 
Hollingsworth were to prevail in the instant case. County clerk reg-
istrars would be advised by the Governor and State Attorney Gen-
eral to defy the holding, and the federal court ruling would exist in 
                                                                                                             
 140 See id. at 1006–07. 
 141 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 142 223 U.S. 118 (1912). 
 143 See id. at 149–51. Although this question is now settled as accepted prec-
edent, Steven Calabresi thinks this decision was arguably wrong as an initial mat-
ter and that Article IV, Section 4 originally forbade direct democracy in the states. 
 144 See generally CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8. 
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vacuo. Whether the injury claimed by Hollingsworth could be re-
dressed by judicial order was thus entirely speculative, and federal 
jurisdiction is not permissible under these circumstances, as was rec-
ognized long ago in Hayburn’s Case.145 
Nevertheless, the issue of whether a litigant has suffered an ac-
tual legal injury and merits standing in federal court is a question of 
federal law. State court rulings as to property, contract, or tort law 
may, in effect, expand the range of state legal injuries for which a 
litigant can sue in federal court; however, while the standing inquiry 
may be intertwined with state law, neither Congress nor the states 
can create standing to satisfy the curiosity of uninjured third par-
ties.146 In Summers v. Earth Island Institute,147 Justice Scalia, writ-
ing for the Court, addressed the question of who has standing to sue 
in federal court: 
In limiting the judicial power to “Cases” and “Con-
troversies,” Article III of the Constitution restricts it 
to the traditional role of Anglo-American courts, 
which is to redress or prevent actual or imminently 
threatened injury to persons caused by private or of-
ficial violation of law. Except when necessary in the 
execution of that function, courts have no charter to 
review and revise legislative and executive action. 
This limitation “is founded in concern about the 
proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in 
a democratic society.” 
The doctrine of standing is one of several doctrines 
that reflect this fundamental limitation. It requires 
federal courts to satisfy themselves that “the plaintiff 
has ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of 
the controversy’ as to warrant his invocation of fed-
eral-court jurisdiction.” He bears the burden of show-
ing that he has standing for each type of relief sought. 
To seek injunctive relief, a plaintiff must show that 
he is under threat of suffering “injury in fact” that is 
                                                                                                             
 145 See generally Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. 409 (1792). 
 146 See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2662–63 (2013). 
 147 555 U.S. 488 (2009). 
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concrete and particularized; the threat must be actual 
and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; it 
must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of 
the defendant; and it must be likely that a favorable 
judicial decision will prevent or redress the injury. 
This requirement assures that “there is a real need to 
exercise the power of judicial review in order to pro-
tect the interests of the complaining party[.]” Where 
that need does not exist, allowing courts to oversee 
legislative or executive action “would significantly 
alter the allocation of power . . . away from a demo-
cratic form of government[.]”148 
Simply put, Hollingsworth did not face an actual or imminent 
legal injury because of the way in which California administered its 
marriage laws, and permitting the Court to adjudicate a lawsuit in 
the absence of such injury would threaten the government’s balance 
of powers by granting increased oversight to the judiciary. Thus, 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Ka-
gan correctly decided Hollingsworth.149 Hollingsworth lacked 
standing to appeal the judgment of the district court. 
III.  THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS EXCEPTION SHOULD BE 
ABOLISHED 
A.   The Origins of Federal Question Jurisdiction 
The asserted basis for federal court jurisdiction in Obergefell, 
Windsor and Hollingsworth is that the lawsuits were brought under 
the first clause of Article III, Section 2, which, as we noted in the 
Introduction, asserts the following: “The Judicial Power shall extend 
to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the 
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under their Authority . . . .”150 In Section 25 of the Judiciary 
Act of 1789, Congress provided the U.S. Supreme Court with juris-
diction to hear appeals from state supreme courts where the validity 
                                                                                                             
 148 Id. at 492–93 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 149 See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. 2652. 
 150 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
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of a federal law or treaty was called into question by the state 
courts.151 The lower federal courts were not, however, given this 
broad grant of federal question jurisdiction by Congress until 
1875—well after the Civil War.152 For more than eighty years, the 
lower federal courts were almost exclusively confined to hearing di-
versity suits and admiralty cases.153 
On March 3, 1875, Congress granted the lower federal courts 
general federal question jurisdiction when it passed the Jurisdiction 
and Removal Act, which stated, in relevant part, as follows: 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Represent-
atives of the United States of America in Congress 
assembled, That the circuit courts of the United 
States shall have original cognizance, concurrent 
with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a 
civil nature at common law or in equity, where the 
matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum 
or value of five hundred dollars, and arising under 
the Constitution or laws of the United States, or trea-
ties made, or which shall be made, under their au-
thority . . . .154 
The language of the grant of the federal question jurisdiction was 
directly modeled on the language of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 
which explicitly provided for federal court diversity jurisdiction 
over “all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity . . . .”155 
As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Ankenbrandt v. Rich-
ards,156 which is the leading case on the domestic relations excep-
tion to the federal courts diversity jurisdiction: 
The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that “the circuit 
courts shall have original cognizance, concurrent 
with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a 
                                                                                                             
 151 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85–87 (1789). 
 152 See Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 
(1875). 
 153 Judiciary Act §§ 9, 11. 
 154 Jurisdiction and Removal Act § 1 (emphasis added). 
 155 Judiciary Act § 11. 
 156 504 U.S. 689 (1992). 
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civil nature at common law or in equity, where the 
matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum 
or value of five hundred dollars, and . . . an alien is a 
party, or the suit is between a citizen of the State 
where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another 
State.” The defining phrase, “all suits of a civil nature 
at common law or in equity,” remained a key element 
of statutory provisions demarcating the terms of di-
versity jurisdiction until 1948, when Congress 
amended the diversity jurisdiction provision to elim-
inate this phrase and replace in its stead the term “all 
civil actions.” 
. . . . 
. . . We thus are content to rest our conclusion that a 
domestic relations exception exists as a matter of 
statutory construction not on the accuracy of the his-
torical justifications on which it was seemingly 
based, but rather on Congress’ apparent acceptance 
of this construction of the diversity jurisdiction pro-
visions in the years prior to 1948, when the statute 
limited jurisdiction to “suits of a civil nature at com-
mon law or in equity.” As the . . . [Second Circuit 
has] observed, “More than a century has elapsed 
since the Barber dictum without any intimation of 
Congressional dissatisfaction. . . . Whatever Article 
III may or may not permit, we thus accept the Barber 
dictum as a correct interpretation of the Congres-
sional grant.” Considerations of stare decisis have 
particular strength in this context, where “the legis-
lative power is implicated, and Congress remains 
free to alter what we have done.” 
When Congress amended the diversity statute in 
1948 to replace the law/equity distinction with the 
phrase “all civil actions,” we presume Congress did 
so with full cognizance of the Court’s nearly century-
long interpretation of the prior statutes, which had 
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construed the statutory diversity jurisdiction to con-
tain an exception for certain domestic relations mat-
ters. With respect to the 1948 amendment, the Court 
has previously stated that “no changes of law or pol-
icy are to be presumed from changes of language in 
the revision unless an intent to make such changes is 
clearly expressed.” With respect to such a longstand-
ing and well-known construction of the diversity 
statute, and where Congress made substantive 
changes to the statute in other respects, we presume, 
absent any indication that Congress intended to alter 
this exception, that Congress “adopt[ed] that inter-
pretation” when it reenacted the diversity statute.157 
The Supreme Court thus concluded that the federal courts lacked 
jurisdiction under the diversity statute over the tort claim of child 
abuse because, in 1787, that statute gave courts jurisdiction to hear 
only “suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity,” which then 
meant lawsuits that could be heard by the Court of King’s Bench, 
the Court of Common Pleas, the Court of Exchequer, and the Court 
of Chancery in Great Britain.158 As we noted earlier, suits regarding 
marriage, divorce, alimony, child support, and probate were heard 
by the Ecclesiastical Courts of the Church of England.159 It was not 
until Parliament passed the Matrimonial Causes Acts of 1857 to 
1878 that an ordinary court—the Court of Divorce and Matrimonial 
Causes—acquired jurisdiction over family law cases.160 In 1875, the 
High Court was created to try all important English cases and was 
given a Queens Bench Division, Chancery Division, and Family Di-
vision.161 The Family Division then acquired jurisdiction over all 
matrimonial causes.162 
                                                                                                             
 157 Id. at 698–701 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
 158 Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582 (1858). 
 159 See id. at 693, 699–700; see also A. T. CARTER, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 177–84 (Butterworth & Co.) (1902). 
 160 Danaya C. Wright, Untying the Knot: An Analysis of the English Divorce 
and Matrimonial Causes Court Records, 1858–1866, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 903, 
903–04 (2004); see also CARTER, supra note 167, at 177–84. 
 161 See CARTER, supra note 167, at 177–84. 
 162 Id. at 177–80. 
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The important point for this article is that when the Judiciary Act 
of 1789 was written, the phrase “suits of a civil nature at common 
law or in equity” was not understood to encompass matrimonial 
causes because the English courts of law and equity did not have 
jurisdiction over matrimonial causes until at least 1857. It is for this 
reason that, in 1858, the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly held in Bar-
ber v. Barber that there was a domestic relations exception to the 
federal court’s diversity jurisdiction.163 Domestic relations cases 
were understood as simply not “suits of a civil nature at common 
law or in equity” that could be brought before the Royal Courts of 
Justice at the Strand in 1789.164 Indeed, Professor Meredith Johnson 
Harbach notes that “[f]ew of what are regarded as the foundational 
cases” of the domestic relations exception to federal court jurisdic-
tion “arose in the context of diversity jurisdiction.”165 Professor Har-
bach observes that, although Barber arose under the federal court’s 
diversity jurisdiction, four other important domestic relations cases 
came about differently.166 
In Ankenbrandt, Justice White spoke for the Court and made two 
holdings regarding the jurisdictional grant. First, the 1948 reformu-
lation of the diversity jurisdiction to replace the phrase “all suits of 
a civil nature at common law or in equity” with the phrase “all civil 
actions” was not meant to change the meaning of the jurisdictional 
                                                                                                             
 163 Barber, 62 U.S. at 589–94. 
 164 See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 698–701 (1992) (discussing 
Barber, 62 U.S. 582). 
 165 Harbach, supra note 28, at 143 n.46 (“Few of what are regarded as the 
foundational cases arose in the context of diversity jurisdiction. Compare Barber 
v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582, 583–84 (1859) (noting that federal jurisdiction arose under 
diversity jurisdiction), with Ohio ex rel. Popvici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 382 
(1930) (coming before Court on writ of certiorari from Ohio Supreme Court, alt-
hough federal law was at issue), De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 308 
(1906) (arising under federal courts’ statutory jurisdiction over territorial courts), 
Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 168–69 (1899) (arising under federal courts’ stat-
utory jurisdiction over the territorial courts), Perrine v. Slack, 164 U.S. 452, 453 
(1896) (noting that jurisdiction arose pursuant to federal habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion), and In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 596–97 (1890) (noting that jurisdiction 
arose pursuant to federal habeas corpus jurisdiction).”). 
 166 Id. 
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grant. Second, the change in term thus did not eliminate the domes-
tic relations exception to the diversity jurisdiction.167 Ankenbrandt 
remains very much the governing case law of the present day. 
In 1948, the statutes governing federal court jurisdiction were 
revised.168 The federal question statute now provides that “[t]he dis-
trict courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising 
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”169 As 
with the 1948 revision of the grant of diversity jurisdiction, the fed-
eral courts have not read the 1948 revision of the federal question 
statute as a change or expansion in its coverage. The 1948 revision 
has been treated as if it were purely stylistic. In particular, the federal 
question grant of jurisdiction has been interpreted since 1948 to en-
compass the well-pleaded complaint rule of 1908.170 Under this rule, 
statutory federal question jurisdiction cannot be based on a plain-
tiff’s anticipation that the defendant may raise a federal statute in his 
or her defense. Instead, a federal statute must be evident on the face 
of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint, which must directly allege 
that the defendant violated the plaintiff’s federal rights under the 
U.S. Constitution, treaties, or federal laws.171 
B.   The Domestic Relations Exception in Modern Day 
In Ankenbrandt v. Richards, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that 
the 1948 revision was purely stylistic and in no way substantive,172 
and the survival of the well-pleaded complaint rule after the 1948 
revision underscores this point. As Judge Richard Posner explained 
                                                                                                             
 167 Id. 
 168 See id. at 164 n.128 (quoting Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 700). 
 169 Id. at 165 n.132 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000)). 
 170 See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908). 
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211 U.S. at 152–54. 
 172 504 U.S. 689, 700 (1992). 
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in 2006, the statutory limits on federal question and diversity juris-
diction survived the revision unscathed: 
There is no good reason to strain to give a different 
meaning to the identical language in the diversity and 
federal-question statutes. The best contemporary rea-
sons for keeping federal courts out of the business of 
probating wills, resolving will contests, granting di-
vorces and annulments, administering decedents’ es-
tates, approving child adoptions, and the like . . . are 
as persuasive when a suit is filed in federal court on 
the basis of federal law as when it is based on state 
law.173 
In 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Elk Grove Unified 
School District v. Newdow that, “while rare instances arise in which 
it is necessary to answer a substantial federal question that trans-
cends or exists apart from the family law issue, in general it is ap-
propriate for the federal courts to leave delicate issues of domestic 
relations to the state courts.”174 Thus, the Court in Newdow held: 
In our view, it is improper for the federal courts to entertain a 
claim by a plaintiff whose standing to sue is founded on family law 
rights . . . . When hard questions of domestic relations are sure to 
affect the outcome, the prudent course is for the federal court to stay 
its hand rather than reach out to resolve a weighty question of federal 
constitutional law.175 
Many commentators, including Mary Anne Case, Cass Sunstein, 
and Dale Carpenter, read the Newdow language as suggesting that 
the U.S. Supreme Court did not want to decide a Fourteenth Amend-
ment same-sex marriage claim at the time.176 Professor Harbach 
writes: 
                                                                                                             
 173 Jones v. Brennan, 465 F.3d 304, 307 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 174 542 U.S. 1, 13 (2004) (citation omitted). 
 175 Id. at 17. 
 176 See Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1791–
92 (2005); Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 
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underpinnings of the domestic relations exception include: Kristin A. Collins, 
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A number of courts continue to apply the [domestic 
relations] exception to federal questions, without ref-
erence to Newdow. . . . 
Some courts have explicitly advocated extension of 
the domestic relations exception to federal questions. 
Other courts have limited the domestic relations ex-
ception to diversity jurisdiction. And still others have 
noted that it is unsettled whether the exception ap-
plies to federal questions. 
Perhaps surprisingly, Newdow itself has had consid-
erable traction in the lower federal courts. A number 
of courts have relied on Newdow to apply the excep-
tion to federal questions.177   
The problem thus arises: were Obergefell, Windsor and Perry’s 
lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of state same-sex marriage 
bans and DOMA “suits of a civil nature at common law or in eq-
uity,” as that language was used in the 1875 Jurisdiction and Re-
moval Act? After much deliberation, we believe yes, they were. 
Though the federal courts did not originally have the statutory 
federal question jurisdiction to hear cases challenging the definition 
of marriage, divorce, alimony, child custody, or probate, family law 
issues were sometimes raised in contexts where they were disposi-
tive of a case at common law or in equity. In Reynolds v. United 
States,178 George Reynolds, a leader of the Mormon Church, was 
criminally prosecuted by the United States for the crime of bigamy, 
which he committed in the Utah territory.179 Bigamy violates federal 
law adopted under Article IV, Section 3, of the Constitution, which 
gives Congress the power to pass all needful rules and regulations 
for the governance of federal territories.180 The U.S. Supreme Court 
                                                                                                             
Federalism’s Fallacy: The Early Tradition of Federal Family Law and the Inven-
tion of States’ Rights, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1761 (2005); and Jill Elaine Hasday, 
The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825 (2004). 
 177 Harbach, supra note 28, at 158–60 (footnotes omitted). 
 178 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
 179 See id. at 146. 
 180 See id. at 152–53, 166–68. 
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correctly asserted federal jurisdiction over this case because the law-
suit involved a federal crime committed in a federal territory under 
a federal law, which arguably violated the Free Exercise of Religion 
Clause of the First Amendment.181 The federal anti-bigamy law, sec-
tion 5352 of the Revised Statutes, provided as follows: 
Every person having a husband or wife living, who 
marries another, whether married or single, in a Ter-
ritory, or other place over which the United States 
have exclusive jurisdiction, is guilty of bigamy, and 
shall be punished by a fine of not more than $500, 
and by imprisonment for a term of not more than five 
years.182 
As we discussed earlier, criminal cases have always been con-
sidered cases in law and equity with federal question jurisdiction, so 
Reynolds’s criminal prosecution clearly arose under federal law. 
However, it is also true that the case against Reynolds rested on a 
federal definition of marriage. Though the case itself did not seek a 
redefinition of marriage to accommodate bigamy, Reynolds did pur-
sue a constitutional free-exercise-of-religion exemption from the 
law against bigamy.183 As demonstrated by Reynolds, when the 
United States brings a criminal case against a defendant whose de-
fense rests on a federal constitutional right, the case qualifies as one 
in law or equity as those words were understood in 1787. 
Criminal cases involving the family were no more covered by 
the domestic relations exception than were tort cases involving the 
family. The U.S. Supreme Court expressly held in Ankenbrandt v. 
Richards184 that a tort suit brought by a divorced wife alleging the 
sexual abuse of her children by her former husband and his girlfriend 
could go forward in federal court, notwithstanding the domestic re-
lations exception.185 Following the reasoning of Ankenbrandt, the 
federal courts had jurisdiction not only to review the constitutional-
ity of Reynolds’s criminal prosecution, but also to judicially review 
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the prosecution of the Lovings in Loving v. Virginia.186 In Loving, a 
white man married an African-American woman in violation of Vir-
ginia’s criminal statute that forbade interracial marriage and misce-
genation.187 The Lovings pled guilty to the criminal charge and were 
sentenced to one year in prison, but the sentence was suspended for 
twenty-five years so long as they left the State of Virginia, which 
they did.188 The couple eventually challenged the constitutionality 
of their criminal prosecution before the U.S. Supreme Court, and 
like in Reynolds, the Court ruled that it had federal jurisdiction to 
decide the case, noting that the suit was not purely matrimonial, but 
rather one of a criminal nature.189 
In contrast, the litigation in Hollingsworth was brought by two 
same-sex couples who purely sought the right to marry and to mar-
ital status under the civil law without respect to any religious teach-
ings as to who can marry whom.190 While the Governor and Attor-
ney General of California agreed with the same-sex litigants that 
Proposition 8 was unconstitutional, California did allow for domes-
tic partnerships, which provided same-sex couples all the tangible 
benefits of a heterosexual marriage.191 The legal injury suffered by 
the plaintiffs in Hollingsworth was, thus, not economic; instead, it 
was rooted in their legal status as a couple being recognized by the 
State of California as “a civil union” and not as “a marriage.” This 
is today a legal cognizable injury for which one can bring a federal 
lawsuit, but that was not always the case as a matter of legal history. 
The Court of King’s Bench, the Court of Common Pleas, the 
Court of Exchequer, and the Court of Chancery would not have had 
jurisdiction in 1787 to hear a case that only challenged the legal def-
inition of marriage, lacking a criminal or civil penalty component. 
Perry’s case was a pure family law case, which did not arise under 
the “common law or in equity” as these terms were understood in 
1787 or 1875. The only English courts that would have had jurisdic-
tion to hear Hollingsworth would have been the Ecclesiastical 
Courts, which continued to hear all English family law cases until 
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the middle of the nineteenth century. Therefore, although Perry’s 
family-law case arises under federal law, specifically the Fourteenth 
Amendment, we do not believe the lawsuit met the criteria of “eq-
uity” as per the original understanding of the federal question stat-
ute. 
The litigation in Windsor differed from that of Hollingsworth in 
that Edith Windsor’s claims involved a tort or civil penalty. We find 
that the federal district court did have jurisdiction over Edith Wind-
sor’s lawsuit against the United States challenging DOMA, insofar 
as it subjected her to a $363,053 cost that she would not have owed 
had she married a man instead of a woman. A suit for money dam-
ages against the government, where there has been a waiver of sov-
ereign immunity, is clearly a “suit of a civil nature at common law 
or in equity” and thereby presents a federal question for the purposes 
of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The English courts of law and equity did fre-
quently hear suits for money damages in 1787, and thus there is 
nothing untoward in the district court’s decision to hear Windsor’s 
case as an initial matter, even though the government lacked stand-
ing to subsequently appeal the case. 
C.   Why the Court Should Expand “Equity” to Include Same-Sex 
Marriage Cases 
Nonetheless, we should be careful about considering the original 
understanding of equity jurisdiction with such inflexibility as in the 
above analysis, for it is indisputable that equity jurisdiction first 
arose in England to correct injustices occurring from an overly strin-
gent and technical application of the law. As the seventeenth-cen-
tury jurist John Selden famously said: 
Equity is a roguish thing: for law we have a measure, 
know what to trust to; equity is according to the con-
science of him that is chancellor, and as that is larger 
or narrower, so is equity. ‘Tis all one as if they should 
make the standard for the measure we call a foot, a 
chancellor’s foot; what an uncertain measure would 
this be? One chancellor has a long foot, another a 
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short foot, a third an indifferent foot: ‘tis the same 
thing in the chancellor’s conscience.192 
Equity jurisdiction is, by its nature, malleable and inherently 
protean, and it exists to correct rank injustices that might occur as a 
result of a technical and rigid application of the law. One can no 
more confine equity to its causes of action in 1787 than one could 
confine the Necessary and Proper Clause193 to only those powers 
that were “necessary and proper” for executing the enumerated pow-
ers in 1787. In 1787, it was not necessary and proper for the federal 
government to have an air force, but it is in 2016.194 As the great 
jurist Robert Bork wrote, “The world changes in which unchanging 
values find their application.”195 
The grant of equity jurisdiction by both the Federal Question Act 
of 1875 and the Federal Question Clause in Article III allows for a 
judicial power whereby the federal courts may, as a matter of con-
science, intervene to correct an injustice at law in situations where 
changes in the facts give an old principle a new application. Though 
federal courts ought not take advantage of this power to expand their 
equity jurisdiction capriciously, it is appropriate for the federal 
courts to intervene when the nation is closely divided on a funda-
mental claim of constitutional right as to the legality of bans on 
same-sex marriage. As Abraham Lincoln said: 
“A house divided against itself cannot stand.” I be-
lieve this government cannot endure, permanently 
half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to 
be dissolved—I do not expect the house to fall—but 
I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become 
all one thing, or all the other. Either the opponents of 
slavery, will arrest the further spread of it, and place 
it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it 
is in the course of ultimate extinction; or its advo-
cates will push it forward, till it shall become alike 
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lawful in all the States, old as well as new—North as 
well as South.196 
The same principle applies to same-sex marriage and, for that 
matter, the legal recognition of polygamous marriage. Over 100 
years ago, Congress recognized that the Union could not tolerate the 
addition of even one polygamous state. Hence, Utah was forced to 
ban polygamy as a condition for admission to statehood.197 Simi-
larly, there are inevitable injustices that surface from the sanctioning 
of same-sex marriage in some states but not in others, and these 
wrongs should bother the conscience of the Court. 
It is to correct injustices that we gave the federal courts equitable 
jurisdiction, and the courts were right to use that jurisdiction to de-
cide on the merits regarding the constitutionality of same-sex mar-
riage bans, even though equity would not have gone so far in 1787 
or in 1875.198  Our confidence in this conclusion is strengthened by 
the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has exercised federal jurisdic-
tion in two very important family law cases within the last twenty-
five years: Michael H. v. Gerald D.199 and Troxel v. Granville.200 
While both lawsuits were pure family law cases—the former involv-
ing visitation rights by adulterous fathers, and the latter involving 
visitation rights by grandparents—none of the Justices or litigants 
doubted the question of federal jurisdiction over the suits. The U.S. 
Supreme Court heard and resolved both cases without any Justice 
suggesting an absence of federal jurisdiction, and there was no ad-
verse response from Congress with respect to the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s assertion of jurisdiction over either case.201 The Court’s de-
cision in Obergefell further confirms our position: the domestic re-
lations exception to federal jurisdiction is archaic, inequitable, and 
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ought to be overruled.202 Hopefully, the U.S. Supreme Court will 
agree when it hears its next same-sex marriage case. 
There remains one final wrinkle in our argument not yet ad-
dressed. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, the U.S. Supreme Court has fed-
eral question jurisdiction to review final judgments rendered by the 
highest court of a state when a decision could be had in which the 
validity of a state statute is called into question on the ground of its 
being repugnant to the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 
States.203 This provision descends from Section 25 of the Judiciary 
Act of 1789, referred to above, and raises the question of whether a 
state Supreme Court ruling on whether a state marriage statute vio-
lated the Fourteenth Amendment in a non-criminal case where no 
financial consequences were at stake could be heard by the U.S. Su-
preme Court as a case in law or equity arising under the Constitu-
tion. The answer is yes, because the U.S. Supreme Court ought to 
recognize a new equitable cause of action allowing domestic rela-
tions cases to be heard in federal court. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, we believe that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to 
hear appeals in Windsor and Hollingsworth for appellants’ failure to 
establish proper standing, and that pure same-sex marriage cases are 
indeed cases in equity for the purposes of federal jurisdiction. We 
agree with the Court’s conclusion in Windsor that DOMA was un-
constitutional, and we applaud the ruling in Obergefell—there is a 
right to same-sex marriage under the Fourteenth Amendment, en-
forceable in federal court. We therefore agree with the Obergefell 
decision. 
It is the nature of equity jurisdiction to evolve over time in order 
to correct rigidities in the common law, and in a constitutional de-
mocracy like ours, new equitable causes of action may sometimes 
be created by Congress, and other times, by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
The word “equity” in Article III has a historical gloss that allows for 
its extension over domestic relations cases. That exception reflects 
archaic, gender-discriminatory laws like coverture laws and laws 
                                                                                                             
 202 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 203 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2012). 
756 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:708 
 
that did not allow women to sue for spousal rape. In light of the 
nation’s core commitment in the Nineteenth Amendment to the idea 
that sex discrimination as to political rights is unconstitutional, we 
think that the Fourteenth Amendment ought to have been read from 
1920 onward as rendering gender-discriminatory civil rights laws 
unconstitutional.204 Since the domestic relations exception to federal 
jurisdiction is inconsistent with the post-1920 promise of gender 
equality in the Fourteenth Amendment, we think both Congress and 
the Supreme Court could and should abolish the domestic relations 
exception to federal jurisdiction in all remaining respects. 
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